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INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine is a paradox. The doctrine is of centuriesold vintage,1 and its obligations have been described as among the
most fundamental imposed on government.2 Commentators
explaining the doctrine in modern terms have noted that it also
responds to unassailable understandings of how democratic politics
works in a liberal democracy.3 Moreover, the doctrine strikes a deeply
resonant chord with Americans, given our national narrative about the
common heritage of our nation’s natural beauty and abundance.4 Nor
is interest in the doctrine an artifact of the nineteenth century, or even
the early, heady days of the environmental movement a generation
ago; in May 2011, the press accorded wide coverage5 to an ambitious

1
The doctrine is generally traced back to the laws of the Byzantine emperor
Justinian. See, e.g., Charles Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429
n.18 (1989) (citing Byzantine law recognizing “public values in water”). For a view
that the doctrine is of considerably more recent, though still centuries-old, vintage,
see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 728 (1986).
2
See, e.g., Karl Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A
Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 287, 288 (2009) (asserting
limitations on government action based on public trust doctrine “are inherent in the
nature of sovereignty”); Mary Christina Wood, You Can’t Negotiate With a Beetle:
Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RES. J. 167, 204 (2010)
(describing Supreme Court’s reliance on public trust doctrine in Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) as grounded in notions of inalienable sovereign power).
3
The classic statement of the democratic flaws sought to be corrected by the
doctrine, and indeed, the classic defense of the doctrine more generally, is Joseph
Sax’s 1970 article. See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 495-496 (1970). To state, as this
Article does, that the doctrine “responds” to the systematic under-representation of
environmental interests in government decision-making is not necessarily to agree
that that problem still exists. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
IOWA L. REV. 631, 658-91 (1986) [hereinafter Lazarus, Changing Conceptions] (arguing
that changes in administrative law since Sax’s article have obviated the underrepresentation concern); see also infra Part IV.C.2 (considering Lazarus’s critique).
4
See, e.g., Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 701 (noting doctrine’s
“mystical and romantic appeal”); Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 433 n.37 (1989)
(describing inspiration nineteenth century American writers and artists drew from
wilderness); WOODY GUTHRIE, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, ON THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND:
THE ASCH RECORDINGS, VOL. 1 (Smithsonian Folkways 1997) (describing “golden
valleys” and “wheat fields waving”).
5
See Felicity Barringer, Suit Accuses U.S. Government of Failing to Protect Earth for
Generations Unborn, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/
science/earth/05climate.html.
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lawsuit filed by climate change activists relying on the public trust
doctrine to request wide-ranging limits on climate-modifying
activities.6
And yet the doctrine raises troubling questions. Its legal source is
murky and confined to a subset of resources which modern scholars
deem as arbitrarily limited in scope.7 But when scholars argue in favor
of broadening the doctrine’s limitation beyond its traditional focus on
aquatic resources, critics can readily criticize them for embracing a
judicial role for which courts have neither the legal authority nor the
expertise,8 and for seeking a doctrinal expansion that neither legal
precedent nor sound policy supports.9
Ironically, the doctrine has also suffered from its success. In states
where arguments have convinced legislators and state constitution
drafters to include protections for public trust assets, the question has
arisen whether the doctrine plays any independent role.10 Attempts to
find such a role collide with arguments that positive law enactments
either codified the public trust doctrine under common law, and thus
superseded it, or that they reflect the same concerns as the doctrine,
thus obviating any need for its independent existence. On the other
hand, where state constitutions encompass the doctrine, they also
arguably incorporate the doctrine’s evolution. Under this latter
dynamic, the state constitutions have not so much superseded the
public trust doctrine as incorporated it, evolution and all, thus
justifying the doctrine’s continued operation under the authority of
the positive law provision. These conflicting understandings illustrate
6
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15-16, Alec L. v. Jackson,
No. CV-112203 (N.D. Cal. filed May 4, 2011), 2011 WL 1675203, available at
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/FEDERAL%20FILE%20STAMPED
%20COMPLAINT.pdf. This lawsuit furnished the template for lawsuits filed in state
courts throughout the nation. See Lawsuits, OUR CHILDRENS’ TRUST,
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/legal-action/lawsuits (last visited June 1, 2011)
(providing links to lawsuits filed across nation).
7
See, e.g., Wood, supra note 2, at 205 (describing geographic limitations of
current doctrine as “superficial”). But see Barton H. Thompson, The Public Trust
Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47,
67-68 (2006) (arguing that doctrine’s limitation to water-based resources is not
arbitrary).
8
See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 712-13.
9
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 7, at 67-68 (noting precedential and policy
significance of doctrine’s confinement to aquatic resources).
10
For a recent attempt to find a role for the doctrine as a component of an overall
environmental protection structure including positive law enactments, see generally
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 749-750 (2006).
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the difficult question of how codification of natural resource
protection affects the continued vitality of the common law principle
upon which that protection was originally grounded.11
These tensions arise because the public trust doctrine both reflects
fundamental instincts about the relationship of government to the
nation’s natural resource heritage, and also suffers from an
incompletely theorized doctrinal foundation and anxiety about judicial
policy-making on technically complex and socially important issues.
This state of affairs is only exacerbated when one considers advocates’
and scholars’ suggestions to increase the doctrine’s reach.12
This Article considers whether these antagonistic characteristics of
the doctrine can be partially harmonized by envisioning an expanded
version of the doctrine as a canon of construction rather than a
freestanding, legally binding, legal principle. Under this proposal, the
protected status of public trust values, and government obligation to
protect those values, would take the form of a background principle
against which positive legislation and administrative actions are
construed and reviewed.
As a background principle, this proposed version of the doctrine
would lack independent legal effect. Moreover, its character as a
background principle means that its influence on actual cases would
be limited by the underlying law for which it acts as an interpretive
aid. Thus, its influence would be filtered through the types of issues
courts are otherwise authorized to decide at the behest of plaintiffs
otherwise authorized to sue,13 the law courts are otherwise mandated
to apply, and the types of relief courts are otherwise authorized to
provide. Rather than serving as a roving commission to overturn any
natural resource allocation decision that a would-be plaintiff may
dislike, this version of the doctrine would limit judicial action to those
cases where binding law already authorizes such action.

11
Compare Klass, supra note 10 (arguing for role for public trust doctrine in
conjunction with positive law environmental provisions), with Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions, supra note 3, at 676-79 (arguing that increased positive law protection for
environmental resources renders the doctrine obsolete).
12
See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological
Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43 (2009) (calling for public
trust doctrine to be expanded to system of protection for natural resources against
threats of climate change and ecological collapse).
13
Cf. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 658-60 (arguing that
expansions of federal standing law have contributed to obsolescing of the public trust
doctrine).
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So understood, this version of the public trust doctrine goes some
way toward harmonizing the intuitive attractiveness of a public trust
principle with critics’ concerns about judicial authority and
competence in overseeing natural resource decision-making. This
Article seeks to demonstrate that understanding the doctrine as a
canon of construction constitutes more than an unprincipled, splitthe-difference compromise between a full-blown, legally binding rule
and no rule at all. Instead, it argues that this understanding accurately
reflects the force of the doctrine as a normatively attractive, deeply
rooted, but ambiguously grounded legal principle that raises legitimate
concerns about the role of the judiciary. In particular, the doctrine’s
proposed character as a canon attempts to mitigate those latter
concerns by tying its application to situations where firmly grounded
law authorizes judicial action.
This Article has modest aspirations. First, it does not call for the
extension to dry land resources of a full-blown, substantive version of
the public trust doctrine. Rather, it confines itself to proposing that
courts interpret positive law enactments against the backdrop of a
fundamental principle reflecting the goals of the public trust doctrine.
Second, this Article calls for such an interpretive canon only in the
context of judicial interpretation of positive law enactments, such as
statutes, administrative regulations and interpretations of those
regulations. There may also be good reasons for reading a public trust
principle into a variety of common law rules; however, the concept of
an interpretive canon fits uneasily with common law adjudication.
Consistent with the Article’s incremental approach, it leaves for
another day the question of the extent to which common law rules
should be modified to include consideration of public trust values.
Third, this Article does not purport to resolve some of the
difficulties environmental advocates face when calling for an expanded
use of the public trust doctrine. For example, critics of an expanded
use of the doctrine cite its original emphasis on commercial activity to
argue that using the doctrine in pursuit of resource conservation
distorts its original focus. By proposing that courts adopt an
interpretive canon based on the modern public trust doctrine, this
Article avoids ultimate questions about what interests the doctrine
should protect; for example, whether the doctrine should protect
commercial uses or evolve away from such protection. Instead,
because the canon is parasitic on the extant doctrine, it takes the scope
of that extant doctrine as a given. Whether that doctrine should
evolve, and if so, how, is beyond the scope of this Article.
As a final preliminary point, this Article does not propose
“downgrading” the extant, water-based public trust doctrine to the
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status of an interpretive aid. Much of the justification for suggesting
that we understand the doctrine as a canon of construction rests on
the lack of a steady legal foundation for an “amphibian” public trust
doctrine. Whatever one might say about the proposal’s ability to
resolve that problem, it is unquestionable that the traditional, aquatic
doctrine enjoys a long-recognized legal pedigree.14 This Article
addresses only the possibility of extending that doctrine onto dry
land15 in the more limited form of an interpretive canon.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly examines the
foundations of the public trust doctrine, demonstrating that the
doctrine has an ambiguous legal foundation. Part II explains that the
ambiguity of the doctrine’s foundation makes it a good candidate for
vindication in the form of a canon. It examines an analogy from
constitutional law — the nondelegation doctrine — that features
similar characteristics and has been vindicated as an analogous canon.
Part III lays out the contours and operation of a public trust canon. It
explains the scope of the proposed canon and offers some preliminary
thoughts about its implementation. Part IV considers possible
objections; based on those objections, it discerns and considers three
criteria that the proposed canon must satisfy to gain acceptance.
Finally, Part V considers the ultimate question: does the proposed
canon promote the same values as the underlying doctrine? Answering
that question requires a return to Part III’s consideration of what the
public trust doctrine really means. Only by understanding what the
underlying doctrine means can this Article ultimately conclude that a
canon is an appropriate way to instantiate the doctrine’s basic
principles in a judicially workable fashion.

14

See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
Even though the traditional doctrine was merely limited to aquatic resources,
but also to particular uses of those resources — fishing, navigation and commerce —
the expansion of uses protected by the doctrine has become well recognized by courts.
See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 465 (“[C]ases have extended the trust beyond the
traditional purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishing, with the most common
‘new’ purposes being various forms of recreation.”). Moreover, courts have expanded
the scope of the water-based resources amenable to the trust beyond those suitable for
navigation. See, e.g., id. at 465 (“[S]ome states have extended the coverage of the trust
beyond those watercourses navigable for title.”). Thus, when this Article refers to an
“extension” or “expansion” of the public trust doctrine, it intends to refer only to its
extension or expansion to protect dry-land resources and uses. See infra text
accompanying note 92 (explaining how doubly attenuated nature of preservation
(rather than access) rights to non-water-based resources renders that expansion of
doctrine a more problematic case for extension of legally binding version of rule).
15
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THE UNSETTLED FOUNDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The public trust doctrine’s legal source remains unsettled. In
addition to constituting a theoretical problem in itself, this uncertainty
carries with it implications for the doctrine’s scope and legitimacy.
As scholars have noted, the seminal cases establishing the doctrine
in the United States do not clearly explain its foundations.16 By the
mid-nineteenth century, it was established that the original thirteen
states succeeded to the crown’s ownership of submerged lands under
tidal waters.17 Soon thereafter the Supreme Court held that the same
rule applied to newly admitted states via the “equal footing”
doctrine.18
With the ownership rule now applied to newly admitted states, the
question then became the state’s ability to alienate its ownership or
control of those lands. While other courts had addressed this question
since the first half of the nineteenth century,19 it was not until the
landmark 1892 case Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois that the
Supreme Court explicitly held that states were limited in their ability
to alienate such lands.20 Illinois Central is notoriously murky as to the
foundations of the rule that prevented Illinois from conveying a large
part of the Chicago lakefront to a railroad corporation. That decision
has been described as resting on state common law,21 federal common
law,22 the federal navigational servitude,23 and an inchoate concept of
inalienable sovereignty.24
16

See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 453 (“Today, . . . after all of the words on
the subject, two foundational issues concerning the traditional doctrine have still not
been decided. The first matter is the source of the trust—where does it come from?
The second is the scope and definition of the trust—what law defines the trust and
what is the content of the trust?”).
17
See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). The idea of royal ownership
can be traced to the New Jersey case of Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). The
Martin Court found Arnold’s reasoning persuasive. See 41 U.S. at 418.
18
See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845). For a criticism of the equal
footing doctrine, see Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 445-47. Despite his critique,
Wilkinson concedes that the equal footing doctrine is well-settled law. See id. at 448.
For a general discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see Steven Anderson, Idaho v.
United States: Taking a Wrong Turn in the Jurisprudence of the Equal Footing Doctrine,
38 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 670-74 (2002).
19
See supra note 17 (citing cases).
20
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892).
21
Appelby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
22
See, e.g., Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal
Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113,
116 (2010) (concluding that “federal common law provides the strongest explanation”
for the public trust doctrine).
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The bare fact that Illinois Central has been described in so many
disparate ways is troubling in itself, because it suggests a fundamental
lack of consensus over the doctrine’s basis, and thus, its source of
legitimacy. As a more practical matter, the confusion about the
doctrine’s foundations makes it far more difficult — if not impossible
— to reach stable, satisfactory conclusions about the precise role of
the doctrine as a limit on government decision-making. These
legitimacy and implementation issues present serious problems for
those advocating its expansion. The doctrine is already subject to
criticism for its anti-majoritarian cast, threat to private property, and
alleged license to judges to make ad hoc judgments about resource
conservation.25 These criticisms are even more salient when the
foundations for that authority are largely opaque.
Scholars struggle to provide a convincing argument about the
doctrine’s foundations. If the doctrine, at least as expressed in Illinois
Central, is based on general federal common law, then there is good
reason to wonder if it should remain viable after Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins26 rejected the concept of federal common law.27 If the
doctrine is based on some broader federal interest, such as the federal
navigational servitude, then presumably it exists as a matter of federal
law. Yet aside from the fact that the Supreme Court itself has abjured
it,28 the federal-law understanding is starkly inconsistent with state
courts’ uneven acceptance of the doctrine.
A state law foundation for the doctrine is equally perplexing. If the
doctrine is based on state law, then one must investigate the state law
source of that rule. A foundation in state common law raises the
23
See, e.g., George Smith & Michael Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 312-14
(2006) (“From this rich history regarding governmental control of the waterways, the
public trust doctrine officially emerged as an instrument of federal common law to
preserve the public’s interest in free navigation and fishing.”); see also Wilkinson,
supra note 1, at 458-59 (noting relationship between federal navigational servitude
and federal constitution).
24
See, e.g., Wood, supra note 2, at 203 (explaining that commentators have
discussed the Supreme Court’s public trust jurisprudence as based in a concept of
inalienable sovereignty).
25
See generally Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3 (illustrating a classic
statement of this critique).
26
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27
See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 455 (noting this criticism).
28
See Appelby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 394 (1926) (describing Illinois
Central as based on Illinois law). See generally Chase, supra note 22 (arguing that
public trust doctrine should be understood as resting on a species of federal common
law).
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problem of why courts sometimes view the doctrine as trumping
legislation, given the principle that legislation can supersede the
common law.29 Yet a state constitutional basis for the doctrine is also
troubling because it raises the question of how such an unwritten
constitutional doctrine interacts with more explicit state constitutional
protections for the environment. Do those more explicit protections
supersede the unwritten protections the doctrine provides?
Conversely, if the doctrine exists as a matter of unwritten state
constitutional law alongside such positive enactments, then what
would be the effect (indeed, what would be the point) of enacting the
more explicit provisions? Finally, if the doctrine is constitutional, yet
unwritten, how did it appear in some state constitutions but not
others; and how did it morph to account for the different
environmental situations in the various states?30 None of these
objections to the state constitutional foundation of the doctrine is
fatal; indeed, I have suggested in earlier writing that state constitutions
may provide the most appropriate home for public trust concepts.31
Nevertheless, these objections raise difficult questions about the
doctrine’s interaction with explicit state constitutional provisions.
Finally, one might argue that the doctrine is fundamentally based on
some inherent attribute of sovereignty. On this theory, the doctrine
reflects the idea that public trust assets are such inherent possessions
of the citizenry that the very nature of the people as sovereign forbids
those assets’ alienation.32 This is, at the very least, an aggressive
reading of the doctrine, placing it not only above day-to-day
legislation, but also presumably above the ability of the people of a
state to provide for the disposition of such assets in the state
constitution itself. In a positivist age, such a natural law-type
understanding of our constitutional order is jarring.33
29
See, e.g., San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999)
(striking down Arizona legislation that attempted to eliminate the public trust
doctrine from consideration in water rights adjudication in state).
30
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public
Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological
Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56 (2010) (noting differences between public trust
doctrines in western states and those in eastern states).
31
See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based
Constitutional Theory, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 439-52 (1997).
32
See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 131, Alec L. v.
Jackson, No. CV-112203 (N.D. Cal. filed May 4, 2011), 2011 WL 1675203, available at
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/FEDERAL%20FILE%20STAMPED
%20COMPLAINT.pdf. (making this argument as part of plaintiff’s complaint).
33
Cf. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 465-70 (2010) (rejecting argument that
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These problematic foundations mean that we must think carefully
before expanding the public trust doctrine. One possible approach is
to conceptualize the doctrine as something less than a fully legally
binding principle, in particular as an interpretive canon. The next Part
considers this intuition — that a canon can legitimately vindicate an
insecurely grounded legal principle.
II.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A CANON OF CONSTRUCTION: THE
PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT

This Article considers the possibility of understanding the public
trust doctrine, at least in part, as a canon of construction. Full
consideration of this argument requires beginning with an explanation
of the type of canon proposed here.
Interpretive canons are well known in law. Such canons — for
example, that statutes in derogation of the common law are narrowly
construed — have long been a standard tool for courts engaged in
statutory interpretation.34 Still, canons’ usefulness is clearly limited.
Most notably, half a century ago Karl Llewellyn famously
demonstrated their lack of determinate meaning when he highlighted
pairs of canons that directly contradicted each other.35 Similarly,
recent studies suggest that judges may use canons to reach their
preferred outcome rather than as true aids to the interpretive task.36
For his part, Justice Scalia has also expressed doubts about canons, on
both judicial legitimacy37 and indeterminacy grounds.38 Nevertheless,
courts continue to employ canons as useful interpretive tools, even if
not decisive ones.39
“inalienable” rights trump an otherwise proper amendment to state constitution).
34
See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEO. L.J. 341, 344 (2010) (“Canons are integral to the process of interpretation. They
have been used since antiquity, and their general contours have been remarkably
stable over time.”).
35
See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950) (noting several juxtaposed canons).
36
See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) (studying six hundred
Supreme Court workplace law cases from 1969–2003 and concluding that canons
were used by justices to support statutory interpretations consistent with their preexisting preferences).
37
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 17-18 (1997).
38
See id. at 25-27, 29.
39
See Scott, supra note 34, at 345 (noting increased use of interpretive canons in
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This Article considers whether the foundational nature of the
principle underlying the public trust doctrine justifies considering that
principle as a background principle, or canon, which influences how a
court understands more firmly grounded law. The argument is that
the principle underlying the public trust doctrine — that “social” uses
of natural resources generate benefits that merit protection40 — is so
important that it warrants consideration when courts construe laws or
review government actions that affect those uses. As such, the public
trust principle constitutes a background principle, or canon, against
which those laws should be construed.
A. The Ambiguous Legal Foundation for the Public Trust Doctrine
Of course, if the principle underlying the public trust doctrine is so
important, the obvious question is why it does not operate as a
freestanding legal rule rather than a canon. And indeed it does operate
as a freestanding legal rule, at least as applied to particular uses of
certain resources, i.e., fishing, commerce, and navigation uses of water
resources. As noted in Part I, this limited version of the rule is well
established in American law, even if its precise grounding is unclear.
Moreover, since Joseph Sax’s path-breaking 1970 article,41 courts,
often following commentators’ suggestions, have expanded the
doctrine’s scope to protect more uses and more resources.42 As a
result, scholars today can point to a large number of states with
vibrant public trust doctrines, some of which extend significantly
beyond the scope of the traditional doctrine.43
Supreme Court majority opinions over last decade).
40
See text accompanying infra notes 85-89.
41
Sax, supra note 3.
42
See, e.g., Marc Poirier, Modified Private Property: New Jersey’s Public Trust
Doctrine, Private Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural
Resources, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVT’L L.J. 71, 84-91 (2006) (discussing New Jersey
caselaw regarding recreation-based public trust claims for access to privately-owned
beach property).
43
See, e.g., Mackenzie Keith, Judicial Protection for Beaches and Parks: The Public
Trust Doctrine Above the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
165, 173-87 (2010) (discussing cases applying the public trust doctrine to dry-land
resources); Deborah G. Musiker, Tom France & Lisa A. Hallenbeck, The Public Trust
and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB.
LAND L. REV. 87 (1995) (arguing that public trust duties apply to wildlife
conservation); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of
Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004) (arguing that electromagnetic spectrum is public resource
capable of protection under public trust doctrine); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980) (arguing that
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Still, problems remain. As Part I explained, the legal foundation for
the doctrine remains murky. This murkiness is far less problematic in
the context of water-based resources because, regardless of the
confusion about its provenance, it is at least clear that some
longstanding legal foundation justifies a judicially enforceable rule
against alienation of at least some aquatic resources.44 Yet even here
the vagueness of the rule’s underlying foundation creates confusion
about the intensity and the nature of judicial review. For example,
should courts simply ensure that government considered public trust
values in its decision-making,45 or should they impose substantive
limits on the impairment of those values?46 Does the rule apply solely
to administrative agencies, or does the rule limit legislatures as well?47
Or is the reverse true?48 Indeed, is the rule somehow so foundational
that it limits the ability of the people of a state to impair public trust
values by enacting state constitutional provisions?
The problems associated with the doctrine’s unclear foundations
become even more acute when one moves beyond water and onto dryland applications. While early state court cases and Illinois Central
provide an explicit limit on alienation of water-based resources, those
cases fail to provide a solid legal foundation for judicial protection of

public trust doctrine applies to federal parklands).
44
See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 428-39 (noting particular importance of
watercourses to uses that eventually came to be protected under public trust
doctrine). See generally supra Part I (noting both the venerability of the public trust
principle in American law and also the variety of possible foundations for that
principle).
45
See, e.g., In re Contested Case on Water Use Permit Application, 174 P.3d 320
(Haw. 2007) (requiring careful, open deliberation before water use permit would be
given).
46
See, e.g., Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (“[t]he purpose
of the public trust doctrine was not to grant the legislature ultimate authority over
natural resource management, but rather to prevent the state from giving out
‘exclusive grants or special privilege as was so frequently the case in ancient royal
tradition.’ ”) (emphasis in original); Citizens For Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State,
103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. 2004) (noting that legislation affecting public trust values
requires “heightened” judicial scrutiny).
47
See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)
(striking down Arizona legislation that attempted to eliminate public trust doctrine
from consideration in water rights adjudication in the state).
48
See, e.g., Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597 (La. 1999) (holding state
constitutional provision enshrining public trust-type obligation on state was aimed at
legislature, not executive branch); Conservation Law Found. v. LaPointe, No. Civ.A.
AP-2003-21, 2004 WL 1598922 (Me. Super. Ct. Jun. 14, 2004) (finding “more
demanding” standard required of government action by Maine public trust doctrine
applies only to legislation, not administrative action pursuant to legislation).
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dry-land public trust values. It is true that scholars have made
compelling arguments analogizing aquatic and dry-land interests for
purposes of their public trust values, and noting the doctrine’s
inherent flexibility.49 However, scholars have noted that, taken to their
logical conclusion, these arguments would give courts wide-ranging
power to balance public trust values and other values, such as private
ownership, economic development, and even preservation of the
public trust asset itself.50 These objections create a serious legitimacy
problem for courts considering whether to bring the public trust
doctrine onto shore. The result, then, is a principle with deep
resonance in American law, only partially enforced as a legally binding
rule, and whose legal foundation is seriously under-determined.
B. The Non-Delegation Analogy
1.

The General Argument

In such a case where a fundamental principle is under-enforced
because of legitimacy concerns and practical difficulties, it may be
appropriate for courts to rely on a substantive interpretive canon.51 As
one scholar noted, it is no great innovation to suggest that courts rely
on substantive canons as tools in giving effect to otherwise underenforced legal values.52
49

See, e.g., Keith, supra note 43 (discussing cases expanding the public trust
doctrine to new resource uses).
50
Cf. Marc Poirier, Natural Resources, Congestion, and the Feminist Future: Aspects
of Frischmann’s Theory of Infrastructure Resources, 35 ECOL. L.Q. 179, 189-192 (2008)
(explaining that New Jersey cases finding a public trust-based right to beach access
had to consider various factors, including congestion and preservation of natural
resource values, when delineating the contours of the right).
51
Two scholars have defined “substantive canons” as follows:
Substantive canons, unlike their linguistic counterparts, are generally meant
to reflect a judicially preferred policy position. They are not predicated on
what the words of a statute should be presumed to mean, or what a rational
Congress presumptively must have meant when it chose to use them.
Rather, substantive canons reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the
courts’ understanding of how to treat statutory text with reference to
judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common law
practices, or specific statutorily based policies.
Brudney & Corey, supra note 36, at 13.
52
See Richard Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 96 (2009)
(“Legislation scholars have long recognized that substantive canons can serve as a
backdoor mechanism to enforce ‘underenforced’ constitutional norms through
statutory interpretation.”).
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An example of a substantive interpretive canon is the nondelegation principle in constitutional law. As a judicially enforceable
rule, the prohibition on Congress delegating its legislative powers is
largely moribund. No Supreme Court case since 1935 has found a
violation of the non-delegation rule.53 In addition, more flexible (and
potentially more meaningful) versions of the doctrine have also been
rejected by the Court in favor of the formalistic “intelligible principle”
test that makes legislation almost impervious to judicial strikedowns.54 Even Justices who express skepticism about important
components of the modern administrative state, such as Justice Scalia,
have also acquiesced in the doctrine’s disuse.55 At the same time, the
federal rule against delegation of legislative power appears, at best,
only as an implication of the statement in the Constitution’s preamble
announcing “We the People’s” establishment of the federal
government.56 Yet the principle that Congress, not administrative
agencies, should make the fundamental policy choices for the federal
government remains a basic assumption firmly embedded in our law.
In response, the Supreme Court has used different methods to apply
the non-delegation principle. First, it has used the specter of the
formal non-delegation rule (which has never been officially discarded)
as a general justification for construing broad delegations more
narrowly.57 Second, and relatedly, the Court has employed the
principle underlying the doctrine to craft a set of interpretive canons
that give narrow constructions to particular types of congressional
grants of power. Cass Sunstein has identified several such canons; for

53

See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420 (1935) (striking down a
section of the National Industrial Recovery Act as violating the non-delegation
doctrine); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935)
(same).
54
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (rejecting
Court of Appeals’ approach to non-delegation, in which overly-broad statute’s nondelegation problem could be cured by agency itself promulgating regulations limiting
its discretion).
55
See id. at 459; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997) (“This
Court has not been notably successful in describing [the line between “making” and
“enforcing” law]”).
56
U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also Cass Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,
98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 331 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Clean Air] (arguing that the
“standard view” of the nondelegation doctrine as a “core part of the original
constitution” is inconsistent with the constitutional text).
57
See Indus. Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. Am. Petro. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(plurality opinion); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342
(1974).
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example, the canon against construing statutes to apply
extraterritorially absent clear congressional authority.58
Sunstein’s analysis responds to concerns that find reasonably close
analogues in the public trust context. Sunstein notes several traits that
characterize the non-delegation doctrine. He argues that the nondelegation doctrine suffers from questions about its legal pedigree,59 its
democratic basis,60 and judicial competence to implement it.61
Nevertheless, he notes that the principle underlying the doctrine is
valuable and deeply rooted in American law. Therefore he seeks to
identify interpretive canons that implement that principle at the more
judicially manageable and legitimate level of statutory interpretation.
These traits also characterize the public trust doctrine. Part I already
noted the concerns about the public trust doctrine’s legal foundation,
its antidemocratic nature, and the difficulty courts encounter in
implementing it. Yet the doctrine — at least in its water-based form —
is an accepted part of American law. Indeed, the public trust doctrine
is a fundamental part of American law; so fundamental that it is
sometimes thought to inhere in the very notion of sovereignty.62
Moreover, the general principle underlying the public trust doctrine
— that the public, qua public, benefits from certain resources held in
common — is not just deeply ingrained in American law, but also
present across broadly different subject-areas. For example, First
Amendment jurisprudence insists on a mythic story in which certain
types of government property, known as “public forums”, are
maintained “in trust” for the people to exercise their speech rights.63
Given the inherently communal nature of speech, the First
58
See Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI.L. REV. 315, 333 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation].
59
Id. at 322-23.
60
Id. at 323-26.
61
Id. at 326-28.
62
See sources cited in supra note 2.
63
See, e.g., Hague v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“[S]treets
and parks. . . have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”). But see Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 692, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
Court’s analysis [confining “traditional public forums” to the established categories of
streets, sidewalks and parks] rests on an inaccurate view of history. The notion that
traditional public forums are properties that have public discourse as their principal
purpose is a most doubtful fiction.”). See generally Karl Baker & Dwight Merriam,
Indelible Public Interests in Property: The Public Trust and the Public Forum, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 275 (2005) (discussing relationship between public trust doctrine
and First Amendment public forum doctrine).
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Amendment analogy is more resonant than it might seem at first
blush. Just as “traditional public forums” allow social interaction via
speech, resources protected by the public trust doctrine also enable
sociability by encouraging commerce.64
2.

Non-Delegation as Non-Alienation

An even closer analogy unites the public trust and non-delegation
principles. At base, both restrict the alienability of a resource thought
to reside most appropriately with the public as a whole.65 The public
trust doctrine restricts government from alienating public trust assets
and destroying public trust uses. Similarly, the non-delegation
principle restricts Congress’s ability to alienate its authority to
legislate. In both cases, the ultimate theoretical foundation for the
restriction rests on the concept of popular sovereignty. In the case of
the public trust doctrine, the public’s sovereignty is thought to rest in
the public’s “ownership” of the trust asset (with the government
merely acting as trustee).66 In the case of the non-delegation principle,
the concept rests on “We the People’s” possession of sovereign power
and, thus, the imperative to respect our decision to vest a part of that
power in Congress, without further alienation.67
The anti-alienation analogy goes further. While the non-delegation
doctrine is usually viewed as a limitation on Congress’s power to
delegate decision-making authority to administrative agencies, an
important strain of the doctrine addresses limits on congressional
power to delegate such authority to private parties.68 While the
Supreme Court has not struck down a statute on non-delegation
grounds since 1935, it has occasionally noted that the statute it was

64

See infra note 87.
Thanks to Chris Serkin for suggesting that I explore this point further.
66
The concept of trusteeship is more than a legal fiction with no bite. Indeed,
commentators have seized on the trustee concept to argue for expansions of the
doctrine. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 2, at 205 (calling for extension of doctrine’s
geographic scope via expansion of government’s “fiduciary duty” to protect “all
natural assets”).
67
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.”); see also J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 141, at 380 (P. Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (“The Legislative cannot
transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated
Power from the People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to others.”).
68
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 53
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] (noting importance of this feature of
statute struck down in Schechter Poultry).
65
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upholding did not delegate government authority to private parties.69
The Court’s apparent concern with delegation to private parties
mirrors the public trust doctrine’s concern with government alienating
the public’s interest in public trust assets. In this sense, the concern
underlying the non-delegation doctrine goes beyond the agency-based
theory under which “We the People” vested federal legislative power
in Congress. Rather, the Court has expressed special concern about
delegating legislative power to private parties. This suggests an
imperative that the People retain sovereign control over legislative
power. If Congress delegated power to non-accountable private
parties, this would frustrate the People’s sovereign control.70
69
See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (“The
objection is made that [the legislative scheme, in which approval of agricultural
marketing orders turns in part on the approval of the relevant producing community]
is an unlawful delegation to producers of the legislative power to put an order into
effect in a market. In considering this question, we must assume that the Congress
had the power to put this Order into effect without the approval of anyone. Whether
producer approval by election is necessary or not, a question we reserve, a
requirement of such approval would not be an invalid delegation.”); Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939) (“This is not a case where a group of producers
may make the law and force it upon a minority or where a prohibition of an
inoffensive and legitimate use of property is imposed not by the legislature but by
other property owners.”) (citations omitted). It should be pointed out that the Court’s
reasoning here is not as precise as one might wish. Currin, upon which Rock Royal
relies, explains that when Congress has made the fundamental decision, it does not
violate the non-delegation doctrine for the statute to make the effectiveness of any
such decision turn on the actions of a private group (such as a group of voters or a
group of commodities producers who will be subject to a marketing order). See Rock
Royal Coop., 307 U.S. at 578 n.64. According to the Court, this is because “it is
Congress that exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation and in
prescribing the conditions of its application.” Currin, 306 U.S. at 16. The Court then
continued, “The required favorable vote [of the commodities growers] is one of these
conditions.” Id. Ultimately, this simply reduces to the same argument that is made in
the context of delegations to administrative agencies: there is no non-delegation
problem because Congress itself has provided the fundamental value choice — the
intelligible principle required of all delegations. Indeed, the case setting forth the
“intelligible principle” standard, while doing so in the context of a delegation to the
President, nevertheless cited the example of state legislative decisions to enact certain
policies upon the approval of a sub-group of the electorate. See id. (quoting J.W.
Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928)).
70
Indeed, to widen the analogy to again include speech resources, one might note
that government is similarly limited in its power to alienate traditional public forums.
See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (“[T]he destruction of
public forum status . . . is at least presumptively impermissible.”); ACLU v. City of Las
Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003). The government-owned property in both
of these cases was described by the relevant courts as a traditional public forum. See
Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80 (concluding that sidewalk in front of Supreme Court
building, the property at issue, is traditional public forum); ACLU, 333 F.3d at 1105
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Like the non-delegation principle, the public trust doctrine reflects a
deep legal principle limiting government power to alienate the
relevant resource out of public ownership.71 But also like nondelegation, the public trust doctrine suffers from concerns about its
precise legal foundation, its democratic legitimacy, and judicial
competence to implement it. Therefore, it is appropriate to at least
consider the possibility of treating the public trust doctrine similarly,
i.e., as a canon of construction.
C. A Word of Caution on the Importation of the Under-Enforcement
Rationale
Despite the parallels between the non-delegation canons and the
public trust canon, one should remain cautious about the uncritical
importation of the under-enforcement rationale for an interpretive
canon.72 Despite its lack of novelty,73 the claim that interpretive
canons are appropriate to implement under-enforced legal values
needs to be considered carefully before one moves on to considering
the specifics of the proposed public trust canon. In particular, this
justification for canons, while attractive, nevertheless raises a difficult
question: what is the relationship between a legal doctrine and its
underlying principles? In other words, if the underlying legal rule is,
for some reason, incapable of competent and legitimate judicial
implementation, then does enforcement of what Judge Posner has
derided as a “penumbral” canon74 reflect legitimate judicial flexibility?
Or does use of such a canon constitute an ultra vires substitution of an
enforceable, but illegitimate, rule for a legitimate rule that courts lack
the competence to enforce?
The answer to these questions turn on the characteristics of the
underlying legal principle. For example, Sunstein’s approval of
interpretive canons construing legislation to avoid excessive
delegations turns in large part on the theory that those canons
vindicate what he called “the framers’ basic project of linking
(noting that Fremont Street in Las Vegas, the property at issue, is traditional public
forum).
71
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
72
See supra Part II.B (explaining that difficult-to-enforce legal principle is
sometimes best implemented as interpretive canon rather than substantive rule).
73
See Hasen, supra note 52, at 96.
74
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (Harvard
1985) (complaining about enforcement of “penumbral Constitution” in which courts
enforce, not given constitutional provision per se, but penumbral version of it, which
itself is not constitutional requirement).
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individual rights and interests to institutional design.”75 This is a goal
he described as “a central aspiration of the constitutional structure.”76
But this justification simply raises another question: are courts
legitimately in the business of enforcing “basic project[s]” and “central
aspiration[s]” rather than law?
That question returns our focus to the underlying legal rule the
canon proposes to enforce. For example, perhaps Sunstein is correct in
justifying his non-delegation canons by reference to an overall
understanding of what the framers were hoping to accomplish with
the Constitution. As a matter of history or appropriate interpretive
method, perhaps the framers are best understood as having attempted
to protect rights by means of institutional design.77 If so, then perhaps
that underlying goal is appropriate for judges to pursue, even if they
have to implement it via canons rather than whatever non-delegation
rule is textually grounded.
But does a similar justification warrant judicial use of an interpretive
canon enforcing the public trust doctrine? To what “project” and to
whose “aspirations” would we look in determining whether a public
trust canon is justifiable? If the public trust principle is a rule of
common law, or even a rule of unwritten state constitutional law (in
the sense that it inheres in the very notion of sovereignty), then what
force is there to the argument that a canon helps implement an overall
coherent picture of the law, analogous to Sunstein’s “basic project” or
“central aspiration” of the Constitution?
A similar concern arises when considering a much more pedestrian
question: what value does a given canon vindicate when it is justified
as an implementation of a broader legal principle? Leaving aside talk
of “basic projects” and “central aspirations,” Sunstein’s non-delegation
canons implement a text — the statements in the Preamble and Article
I in which “We the People”78 vest “all [federal] legislative powers” in
Congress.79 By contrast, the canon proposed here implements a nontextual principle — the idea, of uncertain provenance, scope, and legal
75

Sunstein, Nondelegation, supra note 58, at 339.
Id.
77
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (observing that
federalism is designed, at base, to protect liberties of people, not for state officials
themselves); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 416 U.S. 919, 959-67
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (concluding that legislative veto that singled out
named individuals for adverse treatment constituted adjudication by Congress, which
was inappropriate given Congress’s lack of capacity to protect the rights of single
individuals).
78
U.S. CONST., PREAMBLE.
79
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1.
76
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effect, that certain resources are inherently public and, thus, that
government is limited in its ability to alienate them. This difference
reflects the same insight as that developed in the previous paragraph:
namely, that one cannot uncritically cite concerns about judicial
manageability of underlying principles to justify any interpretive
canon that points in the same direction as that underlying principle.
Rather, context — in particular, the nature and status of the
underlying principle — matters.
Realizing that context matters means that we are confronting a
bigger question than the (difficult enough) one of whether a public
trust interpretive canon is justified by judicial manageability and
legitimacy concerns with the underlying doctrine itself. That original
problem remains, of course, and this Article will address it. However,
the answer may provide raw material for broader examinations of
other canons that are justified on similar judicial competence and
legitimacy grounds. Thus, this Article’s analysis may provide a case
study of the circumstances under which a “penumbral canon”80 may
be justified on the ground that enforcement of the actual legal rule lies
beyond the judicial ken. As explained above, such justifications must
rely heavily on the context of the underlying legal principle, and how
the proposed canon relates to that principle.
This Article seeks to provide this context while illuminating the
canon itself. In other words, as Part III examines how the public trust
canon would operate, it also considers how the nature of the
underlying public trust principle influences the canon’s outlines.
Thus, Part III aspires to justify the public trust canon not just by
explaining how it would work in practice, but also by revealing how
the canon’s outlines are influenced by, and compliment, the
underlying principle it seeks to implement. In so doing, this argument
attempts to provide a template for more nuanced application of the
standard judicial manageability and legitimacy arguments for
analogous canons. After a pause in Part IV to consider some practical
questions about the canon’s legitimacy, workability, and actual impact,
the Article returns, in Part V, to the ultimate question of how the
public trust doctrine should be understood. Only by understanding
that underlying legal doctrine can we truly determine whether the
proposed canon is sound, both as a matter of practicality and deeper
legal coherence.

80

See POSNER, supra note 74, at 285.
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III. A PUBLIC TRUST CANON IN ACTION
This Article proposes that courts construe statutes and review
administrative action threatening public trust values against the
backdrop of a commitment to the protection of those values. This
proposal requires delineation of both the canon’s scope — the
interests and resources to which it applies — and the canon’s
operation — the mechanism by which it would be applied.
Understanding the canon’s proper scope and operation requires
understanding the underlying public trust doctrine. This insight may
be counter-intuitive: at first blush, applying a canon requiring a softer,
less authoritative application of a legal rule should not demand that
we have a deep understanding of that rule, as long as we know enough
about it to apply its principles as a background interpretive aid. As will
become clear, however, the proper operation and, indeed, the
legitimacy of a public trust canon ultimately turn on a deeper
understanding of the public trust doctrine itself.
For this reason, this Part begins with a brief examination of the
theoretical foundations of the modern public trust doctrine in
American law. This examination is necessarily incomplete; volumes
have been written about the doctrine’s foundations, and a
comprehensive examination of that question would distort this
Article’s focus on the canon proposal. Nevertheless, the argument for
the interpretive canon requires at least some preliminary
understanding of the underlying doctrine. After providing that
understanding, this Part then turns to the canon’s scope and
operation.
A. Groundings for the Public Trust Doctrine
The primary impetus behind the public trust doctrine, both in its
more traditional81 and expanded82 forms, is to keep certain property as
a common. As Carol Rose demonstrated a quarter-century ago, certain
stories of commonly held property are not “tragedies” of unfettered,
every-man-for-himself resource exploitation,83 but instead, comedies
— in the sense of having positive, not negative, outcomes.84 In other
81

See Rose, supra note 1, at 762-74.
See, e.g., Keith, supra note 43 (applying Carol Rose’s explanations for historical
identification of some water-based resources as public trust property to dry-land
resources).
83
See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968)
(explaining the concept of “the tragedy of the commons”).
84
See Rose, supra note 1, at 721-23.
82
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words, the story of the commons is not a story of inevitable spoliation
of assets held in common; rather, sometimes society thrives when
property is held in common.
In explaining the benefits of common ownership of certain property,
Rose identified two criteria that historically justified judicial elevation
of the public’s use rights in an asset over private property exclusion
rights: (1) the existence of “holdout” problems, where one landowner
can frustrate the completion of a project promoting public trust
values; and (2) the superior value of the property when made available
for public uses, rather than reduced to private control and public
exclusion.85 Thus, for example, Rose traces the centrality of rivers as
public trust resources based on her understanding of the holdout
problems inherent in private ownership of a resource that, like a river,
cannot be moved.86 Similarly, she explains how commerce emerged as
a socializing activity that created net benefits to the public at large.87
Rose’s explanation explicitly acknowledges the evolving nature of
these factors, in particular, the characteristic of a type of property as
conducive to sociability.88 Thus, while these factors provide the
foundation for the traditional doctrine’s geographic scope and set of
protected uses, their application over time may lead to different results
and an expanded – or at least a different – set of protected resources
and uses.89
Over the last third of the twentieth century a second set of protected
interests, the public interest in natural resource management
(including management of dry-land resources), came to be accepted as
legitimate objects of the doctrine. These interests are related to those
grounded in the historical version of the public trust doctrine because
they refer back to a similar (though not identical) set of resources –
natural resources – that today perform the socializing function Rose

85

See id. at 749-50, 774-81, (explaining nature of “holdout” problems).
See id. at 749-61.
87
See id. at 775-77. For a related, but more theoretical, discussion of this issue,
see generally Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann, The State of Nature and
Commercial Sociaibility in Early Modern International Legal Thought, 2011 available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1753021.
88
See Rose, supra note 1 at 777-81.
89
With regard to commerce, for example, it may well be that commerce has
become so prevalent and performed in so many physical and virtual venues that that
holdout problems have been rendered moot. However, Rose herself suggests that the
sociability effects of commerce remain, given her observation that “[c]ommerce still
seems to be our quintessential mode of sociability,” because “[d]espite its appeal to
self-interest, it also inculcates rules, understandings, and standards of behavior
enforced by reciprocity of advantage.” Id. at 776.
86
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identified as underpinning the classic doctrine.90 But they are different
in that they play an additional, distinct, role, as objects of preservation
rather than of exploitation. This preservative use, while capable of
being shoehorned into Rose’s socializing role, is fundamentally
different.91 The connection between these modern interests and the
traditional interests the doctrine protects is thus doubly attenuated:
the class of protected resources is expanded to dry-land resources, and
the public trust use is altered from public access to preservation, with
or without public access.92
Despite these differences between the traditional and modern
versions of the doctrine, a unifying thread exists in the argument that,
because both conservation and some access uses accrue to the public
generally, they both tend to be systematically undervalued in the
political process.93 The political weakness of diffuse interests is well
known. In constitutional law, courts have sometimes described the
phenomenon of small harms accruing to a large number of persons as
90
See, e.g., Keith, supra note 43 (applying sociability idea to call for public trust
doctrine protection for dry-land resources).
91
For example, the recent climate change lawsuits relying on the public trust
doctrine apply a pure resource conservation/management theory of the doctrine,
which at one level conflicts squarely with the use-based theories offered by Rose. Cf.
supra note 6, at 15-16. An often-cited example of the differing foci of these two
theories is the concurring opinion by an Oregon Supreme Court justice who agreed
with the decision to uphold an airport expansion plan against a public trust-based
challenge on the ground that aviation constituted “commerce” and was thus a
legitimate public trust use. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711, 716
(Or. 1979) (Bryson, J., concurring) (reasoning that airport expansion is consistent
with the public trust doctrine because it promotes commerce and possible air
“navigation”).
One might try to shoehorn the conservation/management idea of the doctrine into a
use-based theory by viewing climate resource conservation as a “use” that, literally,
helps preserve humanity’s continued existence. But this appears to stretch the concept
of use quite far. A more justifiable connection might focus on the superior value of
these resources in their natural state, given the role they play in that condition in
ensuring the supreme public good of continued survival.
92
Indeed, public access may well pose a stark conflict with preservation values.
See Poirier, supra note 50 at 189-192 (noting one scholar’s explanation of how a state
court considering expansion of the public trust doctrine to dry sand beaches had to
balance traditional public trust values with preservation of the resource itself).
93
See generally Sax, supra note 3, at 561 (noting this phenomenon). I have written
about the connection between this understanding of the public trust doctrine and
classic process-based equal protection review. See Araiza, supra note 31, at 403-30.
This is not to say that Sax’s view reflects modern realities; that issue is considered
later. See infra Part IV.C.2. At this point, the argument is simply that if Sax’s view is
still accurate, then it presumably applies to conservation uses of trust resources as
much as to access uses.
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an exception to the general rule that a democratic political process can
generally be trusted to reflect the public’s preferences.94 Bruce
Ackerman relied on a similar understanding of politics when he called
for a reworking of the famous Carolene Products95 formula for strict
scrutiny.96 Ackerman called for courts to recognize the relative
political weakness suffered not by “discrete and insular” minorities, as
the formula originally stated, but by diffuse minorities, which he
argued suffer special handicaps when organizing politically.97
Similarly, in its path-breaking decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe,98 the Supreme Court acknowledged the ease with which
publicly-held assets, such as parkland, would be sacrificed when the
alternative was impairment of privately held assets.99
Public trust values are similarly diffuse and, thus, susceptible to the
same sort of political weakness.100 To the extent that the public trust
doctrine constitutes a species of political process-based judicial
review,101 it helps explain both Rose’s theory that that the traditional
doctrine flowed from the net gains that flowed from putting certain
property to public uses, and the modern doctrine’s focus on recreation
and conservation.
For these reasons, one fundamental characteristic of the public trust
principle informing the proposed interpretive canon is the idea that
public trust values are at risk of being systematically undervalued in
the political and administrative process. This dynamic may be
somewhat less salient today than it was a generation ago, given the rise
of a vibrant environmental movement and increased public awareness
of the importance of public trust assets. But these developments have
not progressed to the point where courts can describe the special risks

94
See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 n.18 (1994)
(discounting, for dormant commerce clause purposes, fact that price increase in milk
caused by discriminatory tax and subsidy scheme would be felt by in-state consumers,
concluding that effect would be too small to be noticed and provoke political
opposition).
95
United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
96
See id. at 152 n.4; Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV.
713, 717-18 (1985).
97
See Ackerman, supra note 96, at 723-24.
98
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
99
Id. at 412-13.
100
Whether and to what degree statutory and administrative law developments
have obviated this problem is addressed later in this Article. See infra Part IV.C.2.
101
See generally Araiza, supra note 31, at 403-430 (considering this claim).
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those assets run in the political-administrative process as a mere
historical artifact.102
B. The Scope of the Canon
At one level, the scope of the proposed canon presents a
straightforward issue. The proposal calls for the canon to apply to dryland resources, a fact that seems to answer the question about its
scope. But bringing all non-aquatic assets within the scope of the
proposed canon would make the canon exceptionally broad. Such a
broad reading is neither essential nor a logical outgrowth of the canon
idea. Because the canon is parasitic on the underlying doctrine, the
limits that inhere in the underlying doctrine curb the canon itself.
For the purposes of this Article, the most important limits on the
underlying doctrine relate not to its geographic scope, but to the scope
of protected uses. The traditional doctrine protects fishing, navigation,
and commerce.103 While many of these uses do not find obvious
analogues in dry-land resources, the recreational and conservation
uses that the doctrine protects surely do. Similarly, the political underrepresentation theory that undergirds the doctrine in both its more
traditional and modern versions104 provides yet another appropriate
limitation on the canon’s scope.
For these reasons, a defensible case can be made for demarcating the
scope of the proposed canon by reference to particular protected uses
and the likelihood that those uses may be systematically ignored in the
legislative-administrative process. This scope is not laid out with
perfect detail. But this should not disqualify the canon from
consideration. The very idea of a penumbral canon protecting a broad
but vague underlying legal value necessarily implies some vagueness
with regard to the canon’s operational scope.

102
Compare Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 658-91 (arguing legal
developments over last 40 years obviated need for relying on public trust doctrine to
correct political dysfunction), with infra Part IV.C.2 (considering Lazarus’s argument).
103
E.g., Tim Eichenberg, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine: Using an
Ancient Doctrine to Adapt to Rising Sea Levels in San Francisco Bay, 3 GOLDEN GATE U.
ENVTL. L.J. 243, 247 (2010) (noting those traditional uses).
104
See Araiza, supra note 31, at 413-30 (examining the political underrepresentation argument for judicial protection of public trust resources).
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C. Implementing the Canon
1.

Introduction

With the canon’s scope generally laid out, the question then
becomes its operation — the mechanism by which it would be
applied. At first blush, one might think that this question raises the
longstanding issue of whether the public trust doctrine provides
substantive protection or simply requires government to consider
public trust values when making a decision.105 However, this approach
misses the point of applying the doctrine as a canon. When
functioning as a canon, the doctrine does not have independent
meaning; instead, it operates to influence the interpretation of other
independent legal sources.
In one sense, this insight simply means that the
substantive/procedural decision is pushed down to the level of the
particular legal rule for which the canon acts as an interpretive aid.
Rather than the doctrine acting on its own as a particular type of
check on government action, a canon implementing the doctrine
might be understood as placing a thumb on the scale in favor of the
public trust value, in whatever form the underlying legal rule
prescribes. For example, a substantive legal rule (say, a water rights
rule) would be interpreted with at least some additional weight on the
public trust side of whatever balancing the rule mandates. Similarly, a
procedural requirement would be interpreted as mandating an
especially probing inquiry into whether the government actor carefully
considered the public trust values at stake in the underlying
substantive decision.
However, even this approach is too simplistic. Implementation of
the proposed canon may require more nuanced consideration by a
court. For example, applying a public trust canon does not inevitably
mean that a court required to balance public trust and other interests
would simply place a thumb on the scale of the public trust value.
Rather, a court could deploy the canon in the manner it thought most
appropriate to vindicate the public trust value at issue, consistent with
the policy choices the construed law imposes.
The model for this approach is federal administrative law as it
developed in the 1970s. During that era, courts struggling to vindicate
the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA’s”)106 promise of reasoned
decision-making focused both on holding agencies to a strict reading
105
106

See, e.g., Coplan, supra note 2, at 304 (citing cases taking both approaches).
5 U.S.C. § 551, et. seq. (2011).
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of the APA’s procedural requirements and ensuring that the final
agency decisions were carefully reasoned.107 Thus, rather than rigidly
confining their review to either process or substance, these courts
recognized the effects each had on the other and performed their
review functions accordingly.108 In particular, procedural fairness was
considered crucial to reasoned decision-making, while reasoned
decision-making was, in large part, equated with procedurally careful
decision-making.109 Similarly, if courts apply the proposed canon, they
can act creatively to vindicate the underlying public trust principle,
using the means that best correspond to the underlying legal duties
found in the construed law.
The key to implementing such a canon lies in the nature of the
underlying public trust principle, the nature of the construed legal
rule, and the identity of the government actor prescribing that legal
rule. Canons have no independent legal stature; their effect lies solely
in influencing how binding legal rules are construed and
implemented. Understanding that influence requires understanding
both inputs — the principle promoted by the canon and the legal rule
upon which the canon acts. It also requires an awareness of the nature
of the actor enacting that rule. This latter factor helps courts stay
within their appropriate bounds when applying the canon, since the
appropriateness of a court’s method turns, in part, on the proper
relationship between the court and the entity promulgating the
particular legal rule at issue.110
The previous subsection briefly set forth a preliminary
understanding of the public trust doctrine in American law. Part V will
revisit this understanding, but for now, it will serve for purposes of the
following analysis. The next subsection considers the other two
107
See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52
(2d Cir. 1977) (connecting agency’s procedural duties under Administrative
Procedure Act’s rulemaking requirements to requirement that agency action be
substantively rational).
108
See, e.g., id. (finding the agency to have employed a less than full rulemaking
process and recognizing that that failure also impacted the substantive reasonableness
of the final agency regulation).
109
Perhaps this latter relationship is most clear in the idea that “substantive”
review under Step 2 of the Chevron test appears at times to be quite similar to the
requirement of procedurally careful decision-making in “arbitrary and capricious”
review of agency action. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997) (proposing that Step 2 of
Chevron and the “arbitrary and capricious” test be considered as identical tests).
110
Cf. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for allegedly reviewing federal statute as if it were regulation
promulgated by administrative agency).
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relevant factors identified above – the nature of the legal rule that is
the subject of the canon, and the identity of the government actor
promulgating that rule.
2.

The Legal Rule and the Actor Promulgating It

It is impossible to describe with any specificity the types of legal
rules whose application might be influenced by a public trust canon.
Such rules come in all shapes and sizes, from water rights statutes to
organic statutes authorizing conservation agencies to manage natural
resources, to municipal ordinances governing access to town beaches.
Beyond the differences in subject matter, legal rules vary by type: from
per se rules, to presumptions, to requirements that a subordinate
official consider a set of factors, to vague requirements of fairness,
equity, or the public interest.111 The enormous variation among the
legal rules subject to a public trust interpretive canon means that this
Article can describe them only through the examples that follow, with
the caveat that such examples are only illustrative. These examples
also illustrate how the identity of the decision-maker appropriately
influences the analysis.
First, consider a legislative decision to alienate a public trust
resource or otherwise impact a public trust value. In that situation, the
canon would likely take the form of a clear statement requirement112
and a rule of narrow construction. These two interpretive rules are
related, in that they both rest on the principle that legislatures must
act consciously when they alienate a resource that warrants protection
under the canon. This principle limits alienations to those that are
intentional — those effects on public trust values that the statute in
question inescapably requires. At the same time, the fact that courts
would apply a canon, rather than a substantive rule of law, means that
the legislature enjoys the ultimate authority to alienate public trust
resources, without having to satisfy any more demanding judicial
standard beyond drafting precision.113
111
E.g., 47 U.S.C § 307(a) (“The [Federal Communications] Commission, if public
convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any
applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chapter.”).
112
In the words of one scholar, a “plain statement” or “clear statement”
requirement is a requirement that, “(in its strongest) version rejects interpretation of a
statute that overrides substantive values embodied in the rule, unless the statute
explicitly so provides.” William Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory
Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 880-81 (1993).
113
Compare, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me.1981) (requiring
“high and demanding standard of reasonableness” to legislation alienating public trust
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As noted above,114 statutes can vary greatly in terms of the specificity
of the rule they impose. A given statute’s level of specificity obviously
matters when a court considers the canon’s impact. All other things
being equal, a more specific statutory provision would be more
resistant to construction in favor of public trust values than a more
general one, because the former would more likely satisfy a clear
statement requirement. Other characteristics would also matter if a
court applies either a clear statement or narrow construction
interpretive approach. For example, a mandatory provision would be
more resistant to a public-trust-favorable reading than a permissive
one, and one espousing a single clear policy value would be more
resistant than one that seeks to accommodate a variety of values.
Consider now an administrative agency’s alienation decision.
Presumably an agency would reach such a decision either by using the
discretion the statute granted it, or by carrying out a precise legislative
directive. In the former case, the canon would operate primarily as a
process-based requirement of administrative rationality, assuming that
the legislature did in fact clearly grant this authority.115 The goal, as it
usually is when courts review discretionary agency action, would be to
ensure that the agency carefully considered the factors relevant to its
decision. In this situation, courts could apply the canon by ensuring
that the agency considered the public trust values at stake as one of
the relevant decisional factors.116 If, by contrast, the agency acted in
response to an explicit legislative mandate, administrative law
principles117 suggest a shift in the inquiry. If the statute really
resources), and Jackvony v. Powell, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941) (holding that traditional
beach access rights protected under Rhode Island law and incorporated into 1843
state constitution forbade city’s construction of fence limiting access to municipal
beach).
114
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
115
Compare Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255 (R.I. 1999)
(requiring explicit statutory language before concluding that legislature authorized
municipalities to regulate construction on waterways), with Moot v. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 861 N.E.2d 410 (Mass. 2007) (holding that legislature did not give agency
authority to relinquish state ownership interests in tidelands when it gave it authority
to “preserve and protect” them).
116
In terms of the identity of the decision-maker, it bears noting that the
procedural rationality review described here would likely be considered an illegitimate
approach for judicial review of legislative action, given the separation of powers
problems inherent in a court reviewing the legislature’s work product for adequate
deliberation.
117
At the federal level, the most notable principle here is the so-called Chevron
“two-step” for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. See generally
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
that courts do not defer to agency interpretations when statute provides clear answer
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compelled the agency to alienate the resource, then the judicial
inquiry would shift up the ladder, to judicial construction of the
statute.
Admittedly, these examples are couched at a high level of generality.
However, even this brief, abstract examination of the different forms
of legislative and administrative action illustrates the wide variety of
criteria that would affect how a government action would be
construed pursuant to the canon. Should the canon concept be
accepted as a general matter, more work would be needed to flesh out
its actual operation.
IV. OBJECTIONS
The above analysis may elicit objections from all sides: those who
object to any expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond waterbased resources, those who favor an explicit expansion of a legally
binding public trust doctrine beyond its current water-based focus,
and those who simply question the legal analysis offered so far. These
objections identify three general criteria that must be satisfied for the
proposed canon to be acceptable. First, the proposed canon must be
legitimate. Second, it must be workable. Third, its effects must be
meaningful, yet appropriately limited.
A. Legitimacy
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the proposed public trust
canon is that it is legally unprincipled. This objection maintains,
reasonably enough, that a substantive interpretive canon118 must be
justified by some underlying legal principle reflecting that substantive
preference. It argues that a public trust value that extends beyond
water-based resources lacks that foundation. Thus, even in its less
binding form as a canon, it is illegitimate. This objection restates the
argument against extension of a legally binding public trust doctrine
to dry-land resources, and applies it to this Article’s proposal for a
canon. It forces us to confront the question of whether a canon is
justifiable, even if a legally binding rule of the same sort is not.
It is not uncommon for a basic legal principle to lack a firm legal
foundation.119 Basic structural components of our system, such as

to interpretive question presented, but defer to any reasonable agency interpretation
when statute is ambiguous as to answer).
118
See supra. note 51 (defining “substantive” canons).
119
See, e.g., sources cited infra note 121.
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federalism, are sometimes expressed only by implication.120 Other
basic principles have an even more obscure formal foundation. For
example, the requirement that government act only in pursuance of a
public purpose is thought to be fundamental to our conception of
republican government, but is nowhere explicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.121 These high level examples illustrate that the lack of a
firm textual foundation does not necessarily defeat an argument that a
legal principle functions as a legally binding rule.
Nevertheless, the legitimacy argument against a public trust canon
maintains that such a canon lacks even the implicit foundations we
can discern for principles such as federalism. In considering that
objection, it is necessary to examine the two foundations cited for the
public trust doctrine: precedent, most notably the Supreme Court’s
decision in Illinois Central and state court decisions finding the public
trust doctrine to apply as a matter of state law, and the policy
arguments offered to justify expanding that doctrine beyond its
traditional limits. The question is whether these sources provide an
adequate legal foundation, not for a legally binding expanded public
trust doctrine, but for a principle that would adequately support the
proposed canon.
So posed, the question seems to elicit a fairly clear answer in favor
of the canon’s legitimacy. The public trust doctrine unquestionably
exists as a legally binding rule and has existed for centuries.122
Moreover, the traditional doctrine responds to concerns about the
political vulnerability of diffusely held public resources that transfer,
with more or less ease, to a wider set of resources and uses. As the
“more or less” qualifier suggests, the transfer is not trouble-free.
Bringing the doctrine onto dry land would represent a major
expansion in its scope, as would embracing uses grounded in
120

See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114 (1978) (“The
Constitution presumes the existence of the states as lawmakers and governmental
institutions distinct from the federal government.”); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (referring to federalism as follows: “Some truths are so basic
that, like the air around us, they are easily overlooked.”); see also, e.g., Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing as a
“fundamental constraint” on government action the requirement that such action be
taken in pursuit of a public, rather than a private, purpose).
121
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 61 (2001) (“[T]he
American constitutional tradition has long recognized a judicial authority, not
necessarily linked to any specifically enumerated guarantee, to invalidate truly
arbitrary legislation.”); see also Webster, 486 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
the fundamental nature of the rule against government action in pursuit of purely
private interests).
122
See supra note 1.

2012]

The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon

725

conservation rather than access.123 As explained earlier, because these
expansions would involve the judiciary in a wide-ranging set of policy
issues, there is reason for concern about these moves. This is
especially the case when legislatures and constitution drafters have
begun to embrace these values in positive law.
However, these conceded problems with an expansion of the
judicially enforceable doctrine do not affect the relevant conclusion: a
legally binding rule protecting public resources exists and finds
support in modern understandings of politics in a liberal democracy.
The rule itself may lack a clear legal foundation.124 The modern rule
may also bear only partial resemblance to its earlier focus on
commerce promotion.125 Nevertheless, the modern resource-protecting
version of the rule is well established in American law. The argument
for a canon relies simply on the existence of a supporting legal rule,
not on whether that rule itself is unambiguously grounded and has
remained in its original form for centuries.
Thus, the existence of that rule opens the possibility for a wider, but
penumbral, principle that takes the form of an interpretive canon. It
does not prove the argument; the bare fact that a legal principle exists
does not by itself make the case for a broader penumbral interpretive
canon. But it does furnish a foundation for such a canon should the
rest of the argument be made.
B. Workability
Another objection to this proposal argues that a canon protecting
public trust values is unworkable. At its base, this argument is
grounded on Karl Llewellyn’s and others’ critiques of canons as
radically indeterminate,126 although the argument here points in a
slightly different direction. As applied to a public trust canon, the

123
See, e.g., Niki Pace, Wetlands or Seawalls? Adopting Shoreland Regulation to
Address Sea Level Rise and Wetland Regulation in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 327, 344 (2011) (noting how “some states have expanded the public trust
doctrine to encompass recreation”); Margaret Poloso & Margaret Caldwell, Dynamic
Property Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 51, 52 (2011) (“[p]rovid[ing]. . . a theoretical explanation of how common
law doctrines can expand the regulatory authority of the public trust onto dry land.”).
124
See supra Part I.
125
But see, e.g., Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979) (relying
on commerce-promotion goals of public trust doctrine); Rose, supra. note 1 at 776
(arguing for the continued vitality of the commerce-promotion justification for the
public trust doctrine).
126
See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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basic thesis is that such a canon, however applied,127 amounts to a call
to judges to place a thumb on the scales in favor of public trust assets.
The criticism here centers on the idea that the very notion of a “thumb
on the scales” is incapable of providing a determinate standard by
which judges could decide whether the public trust asset has been
accorded sufficient protection.128
1.

Workability as Analytical Coherence

To the extent this objection amounts to a general indictment of
standards of review, it proves too much. Courts go to great lengths to
delineate standards of review, both of legislative and administrative
action and the decisions of lower courts. It is true enough that at times
these standards appear to determine less than one might think. For
example, studies demonstrate that the (in)famous distinction between
Chevron and Skidmore deference to federal administrative agency
statutory interpretations does not translate into radically different
affirmance rates for those interpretations.129 On the other hand, while
it is easy to criticize the Supreme Court’s inconsistent applications of
review standards in constitutional cases, lurking behind those
exceptions is the mine run of constitutional cases where, for example,
rational basis review really is exceptionally deferential, and strict
scrutiny really is searching.130 One can find similar real world effects of
127
See supra Part III.C. (discussing possibility of both substantive and procedural
applications of such canon).
128
Cf. Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1785 (1975) (casting doubt on judicial practice of narrowly construing
agency-authorization statutes to ensure consideration of under-represented interests,
based on concern that such practice “tends to multiply the issues for decision in a way
that diminishes the odds of finding a clear statutory directive to resolve the
controversy”).
129
See, e.g., Richard Pierce, What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Action
Mean? 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604701 (finding difference in affirmation rate of less than
3%). On the other hand, a recent study does suggest that, at least the Supreme Court
level, the difference between these standards and the Seminole Rock/Auer standard for
reviewing agency interpretations of their own regulations does translate into
significantly different affirmance rates. See generally id. (analyzing court cases
applying these two standards and reaching this conclusion).
130
See, e.g., Edward Lyons, Reason’s Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty, 55
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 157, 160 (2007) (“In default cases involving regulation of “garden
variety” social or economic activity, a deferential “rational basis” standard is
applied.”); Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
60 (1992) (arguing that strict scrutiny and rational basis standards were designed to
prevent courts from falling into temptation to engage in ad-hoc balancing).
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standards of review in the area of appellate court review of lower court
fact-findings and legal conclusions.131 Simply put, standards matter.
But this objection goes deeper, questioning whether the very nature
of a canon requiring consideration of public trust values can ever be
expressed so precisely as to provide a workable standard. So
understood, the objection here is not so much an allegation that
“standards don’t matter,” but rather, that a standard in this area is
incapable of providing courts with a precise and workable guide.
Thus, the objection goes, it may be one thing to require an appellate
court to consider whether an agency’s statutory interpretation decision
is “reasonable,”132 to review a lower court’s fact-findings for “clear
error,”133 or to review a statute to determine whether it was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest,134 but quite
another thing to direct a court simply to consider public trust values
whenever a decision implicates those values.
This is a fair objection. However, it bears repeating that the
proposed canon is not as terse or simplistic as the prior paragraph
suggests. Rather, the characteristics of the underlying public trust
principle — the nature of public trust assets in our political and legal
system, and their role in society — help shape how courts should
implement this canon. Recall those characteristics: the inherently
public nature of these goods, both in terms of the uses that are made
of them and, in light of those uses, the net losses that flow from
recognizing private ownership rights; and the implications of such
publicness for their protection in our liberal, pluralistic political
system. These characteristics help shape the scope and intensity of the
consideration courts should give to protecting public trust resources
via an interpretive canon.
Further, as explained earlier,135 an important input into the
interpretive task would be a judge’s understanding of the particular
requirements of the construed legal source. Because the protection for
131

See, e.g., Joshua Fischman & Max Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review
Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 2010-23, (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434123 (suggesting that standards of review in federal
criminal sentencing context do exercise some constraining effect on judges).
132
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984) (requiring that courts review agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
provisions for reasonableness).
133
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52.
134
See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991) (applying this standard).
135
See supra. Part III(C)(2).
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public trust values this Article proposes takes the form of influence on
a court’s construction of a separate and distinct legal requirement
(such as a statute), the application of the proposed canon would
necessarily vary with the characteristics of that legal rule.
Thus, implementing the canon amounts to far more than a judge
placing an inchoate, generalized “thumb on the scale.” Rather, when
properly understood, it responds to the particular position of public
trust assets in the given case, considering the identity of the relevant
parties (e.g., a legislature as opposed to an agency) and the nature of
the legal provision being construed. This understanding of the canon
refutes criticism that the proposal is analytically incoherent. It may be
difficult to apply — a matter taken up by the next section — but not
conceptually incoherent.
2.

Workability as Judicial Competence

One might concede the theoretical coherence of the approach
sketched out above, but still object to the canon on the ground that it
imposes insurmountable practical difficulties on courts. This objection
centers on concerns about judicial competence. It reflects the fact that
the canon would require courts to determine how to apply a relatively
vague presumption in favor of public trust uses, and then factor that
presumption in to what is often an already complex set of legal
standards governing the challenged action. Unquestionably, the
combination of these steps adds to the complexity of cases involving
the proposed canon. Inevitably, adding another factor to a court’s
consideration of any legal issue increases the issue’s complexity. But
this additional difficulty is not so different in type or degree as to
justify rejecting this canon on judicial competence grounds.
First, as explained earlier,136 applications of substantive
presumptions and standards of review are part and parcel of courts’
work. Judicial experience with this task includes both steps outlined
here: determining what a particular presumption or review standard
requires in a given case and then applying it.137 On its face, nothing
about the public trust canon makes its application different, either in

136

See supra Part IV.B.1.
Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (determining, as
matter preliminary to applying applicable standard of review to agency’s statutory
interpretation decision, what that standard should be), with United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (determining appropriate
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact, which in turn requires
distinguishing between law and fact, before applying that resulting standard).
137
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type or degree, from other glosses that courts must apply when
interpreting legal texts.
Second, particular applications of the canon are quite analogous to
other requirements that are widely present in American law. For
example, the requirement that agencies evaluating policy options
consider all the relevant factors exists in most, if not all, administrative
law systems.138 Applying the canon to situations where an agency
makes a discretionary decision that impacts public trust resources
would entail the same type of review, adding public trust values to the
factors the agency must consider. Similarly, substantive canons
abound in American law.139 Whether called clear statement rules,
presumptions, or interpretive canons, these guides are familiar to
American judges.
Third, nothing in the rationales underlying the public trust canon
makes the canon particularly resistant to competent judicial
application. For example, when a statute requires an administrative
agency to consider diffuse interests, such as public health, reviewing
courts will necessarily examine the resulting administrative rule to
confirm that the agency considered that interest.140 Nothing about the
diffuseness of public trust values makes it more difficult for a court to
apply this canon’s procedural version. Nor is there anything unique
about a substantive presumption in favor of public trust assets that
renders that version of the canon any more difficult to apply than the
myriad of clear statement rules, presumptions, and canons that exist
elsewhere in American law. Courts may sometimes find it difficult to
determine whether a statute has satisfied such a rule.141 But there is no
reason to think that a substantive presumption in favor of public trust
resources is any harder for courts to manage than presumptions

138
In the federal system, this requirement has been explicated in a series of
foundational Supreme Court cases. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations v., 129 S.Ct.
1800, 1810-1812 (2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 55 (1983); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971).
139
See, e.g., United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976)
(describing canon that disfavors reading statute as impliedly repealing an earlier
statute).
140
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that it
does not violate non-delegation doctrine for Congress to require the EPA to
promulgate air quality standards “requisite to protect the public health” and then
reviewing whether agency’s implementation of that mandate was reasonable).
141
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (reflecting
disagreement between Justices as to whether CERCLA statute clearly abrogated state
sovereign immunity).
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against federal intrusions into the federal-state balance142 or
authorizations to agencies to act retroactively,143 or narrow
constructions of statutes in derogation of the common law.144 It may
be true that cases involving public trust assets would arise more
frequently than cases implicating other types of presumptions –
though this is by no means self-evident. But even if that were true,
there is no reason to think that this additional volume of cases
translates into a more difficult inquiry for courts on a case-by-case
basis, or even that it in the aggregate it adds to courts’ burdens so
much as to justify rejecting such a presumption as beyond judicial
capacity.
C. Meaningfulness
The foregoing objections flow from concerns about the canon’s
legitimacy and practical workability. Another set of objections turn on
the canon’s real world effects. An objection coming from public trust
protection sympathizers argues that the canon is largely superfluous.
This objection argues that legal protections for environmental
interests, most notably state constitutional provisions and so-called
“little NEPAs,”145 provide both the substantive and procedural
protection that this canon would deliver. At the other end of the
spectrum, one might object that the canon effectively expands to dryland resources the full-blown version of the public trust doctrine.
1.

The Comparative Scopes of the Canon and Positive Law

The first response to the objection about superfluity is that a public
trust canon may cover situations that are not covered by little NEPAs

142
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 453 (1991) (construing Age
Discrimination in Employment Act not to apply to state court judges given federalism
implications of such interpretation).
143
See Bowen Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (noting
presumption that Congress does not give agencies authority to promulgate regulations
with retroactive effect).
144
See, e.g., NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 61.01 (7th ed. 2011) (“[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly construed . . . .”).
145
“Little NEPAs” are the state-law versions of the federal National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) [hereinafter NEPA]. In a nutshell, NEPA
requires the federal government to consider the environmental impacts of any major
federal action significantly affecting the environment. Little NEPAs are state laws that
impose analogous requirements on state governments. For a discussion of NEPA, see
STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 81,143 (5th ed. 2010).
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or other positive law. Little NEPAs do not exist in all states146 and vary
greatly in their coverage, their requirements, and their provisions for
judicial review.147 Moreover, their general requirement that
government consider environmental impacts does not completely
track the impact a canon would have. For example, little NEPAs
generally do not apply to state legislatures.148 By contrast, this Article
envisions that the proposed canon would apply to legislation.
Still, the objection may have force in a state that has enacted in its
positive law significant substantive and procedural protections for the
environment.149 But this fact should count in favor, not against, the
canon proposal. The basic idea behind the canon is that it responds to
a fundamental background principle of American law that may be
difficult to instantiate because of concerns about judicial authority and
competence. To the extent that the legislature of a state (or its people,
in the case of a constitutional amendment) translates that broad
principle into a precise legal rule enforceable by a court, one can
conclude that canon has served its purpose. At that point, the canon
can appropriately fade from the scene, at least to the extent the
positive law protection covers the situation at hand. This dynamic is
somewhat analogous to the familiar principle that statutory law
supersedes the common law. When a positive law enactment provides
the protection that the canon would otherwise provide, it is
appropriate to conclude that the purpose of the canon — to ensure
that public trust values are recognized — has been satisfied.

146
See David Sive & Mark Chertok, Little NEPAs and Their Environmental Impact
Assessment Procedures, SK008 ALI-ABA 325, 327-28 (2004) (describing 2004 survey
counting 15 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico as jurisdictions that have
enacted a little NEPA); see also Daniel Selmi, Themes in the Evolution of the State
Environmental Policy Acts, 38 URB. LAW. 949, 951 (2006) (describing 2006 survey two
years later counting 16 states, along with District of Columbia and Puerto Rico).
147
See Sive & Chertok, supra note 146 (noting the coverage and judicial review
provisions of little NEPAs); Selmi, supra note 146, at 954-57 (noting the coverage
provisions of little NEPAs).
148
See Selmi, supra note 146, at 956.
149
See, e.g., Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246
(Mont. 1999) (concluding Montana Constitution requires actions infringing on
citizens’ enjoyment of a clean environment satisfy version of strict scrutiny); Selmi,
supra note 146, at 982 (illustrating that California’s little NEPA, the California
Environmental Quality Act, “establishes a policy that agencies should not approve
projects where feasible alternatives or mitigation measures would reduce
environmental damage”).
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Has American Law Obviated the Public Trust Doctrine?

The prospect, noted in the prior section, of positive law superseding
the proposed public trust canon raises the empirical question of
whether this dynamic has occurred to such a degree that the canon is,
in fact, already obsolete. Writing in the mid-1980s, Richard Lazarus
suggested that the public trust doctrine may have outlived its
usefulness, in part because of developments in public law that
increased government power to protect public trust values in privately
held land and recognized government’s duty to protect such values in
its decision-making more generally.150 However, developments since
Professor Lazarus’s article call into question the vitality of at least
some of the phenomena he believed to have obsolesced the doctrine.
First, takings law has moved, at least somewhat, toward increased
protection for private property. Heightened requirements for
conditional development permits,151 per se rules finding a regulation to
constitute a taking,152 acceptance of the idea that landowners can have
a takings claim even when they take title to property after the state has
reduced the relevant bundle of sticks associated with property
ownership,153 and the possibility that the Court may recognize a taking
based on a state court’s interpretation of state property law154 all
suggest at least somewhat greater protection for private property
owners against government regulation imposed for environmental
reasons.155 Together these developments156 call into question the
150

Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 658-91 (1986).
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (requiring some
relationship between development permit conditions and problem caused by
development).
152
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19 (1992)
(describing regulatory takings of landlords’ property rights).
153
Compare Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-28 (2001) (holding that
a landowner can have a valid takings claim even when the law reducing his property
rights was enacted before he purchased the parcel in question), with Richard J.
Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights
Movement within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 815-17 (2006) [hereinafter
Lazarus, Measure of a Justice] (arguing Palazzolo is not as strongly pro-property rights
as might appear).
154
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2612 (2010) (plurality opinion) (recognizing possibility of a judicial
taking); id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to decide this issue but
expressing doubt about concept of judicial taking); id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(declining to decide this issue).
155
Moreover, the hotly contested 5−4 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005), and, perhaps even more directly, states’ responses to Kelo, at least
raise the possibility that claims of public use will be more carefully scrutinized when
151
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modern force of Lazarus’s argument that the expansion of the police
power has rendered less relevant the property rights−reservation
theory underlying the classic public trust doctrine.
Second, the administrative law developments Lazarus identified,
which he argued mitigated the need for the public trust doctrine to
ensure adequate government consideration of public trust values, have
also moved in a direction unfavorable to those values. Federal courts’
increased reluctance to review programmatic agency action at the behest
of environmental plaintiffs157 makes it harder to obtain judicial review of
the broader environmental decisions that are most important for many
public trust values today. At the same time, the arguable decline in the
intensity of “hard look” review of agency action158 suggests that when
courts engage in such review, it may not be as searching as Professor
Lazarus was able to assume a quarter-century ago.
Third, the rise of cost-benefit analysis — a phenomenon Professor
Lazarus identified159 — raises new risks to the consideration of public
trust values. As scholars have long noted, elevation of cost-benefit
analysis as a major factor in administrative decision-making raises
difficult issues about the valuation of interests that are not easily
quantifiable, let alone monetizable.160 While scholars offer various
private property rights are at stake. Concededly, Kelo is technically not on point, given
that it focused on the question of government power to acquire property by eminent
domain when the public use was alleged to be a private use in disguise. Presumably,
such actions in pursuit of public trust values easily come within the public use rubric.
Still, the controversy surrounding Kelo is consistent with a greater solicitude for
private property rights that may affect government power to impact property rights in
pursuit of public trust values.
156
The Court’s — and states’ — directions with regard to the takings clause is not
completely clear. See Lazarus, Measure of a Justice, supra note 153, at 811-23
(suggesting that the Court has flagged in its protection of private property rights). At
the very least, though, the developments identified in the text, which occurred after
Professor Lazarus wrote, suggest at least greater protection for those rights at the
expense of broad government power to act to protect public trust values.
157
See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004) (finding
ongoing agency obligations unreviewable under the APA); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885-900 (1990) (finding programmatic agency action
unreviewable under the APA).
158
Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983) (using arguably strict review to strike down the agency’s consideration of a
regulatory issue under “arbitrary and capricious review”), with FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (arguably reviewing the agency’s action under more
deferential standards).
159
See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 682 n.317.
160
See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
144 (2005) (characterizing, quantifying, and monetizing “full range” of climate

734

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 45:693

methods to account for these difficulties within the context of a
general cost-benefit mandate,161 the general focus on cost-benefit
analysis raises the possibility that the administrative process will be
systematically skewed against interests, such as public trust interests,
that are not easily reducible to inputs in cost-benefit calculations.
These public law developments described above generally refer to
federal rather than state law. Still, to the extent they reflect general
trends in public law,162 they suggest that the developments Professor
Lazarus identified as obviating the need for the public trust doctrine
may have either slowed down or even partially reversed, thus making
some version of a public trust principle relevant once again.
3.

Does the Canon Amount to a Backdoor Expansion of a Legally
Binding Public Trust Doctrine?

The opposite objection to the proposed canon is that it is too
aggressive, in that it all but envisions expansion of a legally binding
public trust doctrine. This objection describes the public trust
doctrine as a requirement that government give heightened
consideration to public trust values. Thus, some argue that the classic
public trust itself takes the form of a presumption, or as expressed in
this Article, a canon of construction. If so, then this Article’s call for
such a canon is essentially indistinguishable from a call for expanding
the doctrine itself. This argument is a fair one; on reflection, however,
it loses much of its force.
First, the premise of the argument — that the public trust doctrine
functions not as a substantive restriction on government authority but
rather as a de facto “hard look” requirement or presumption — is not
completely accurate. Courts often use the doctrine as a substantive

change effects as “conceptually, ethically and empirically very difficult”); Jonathan
Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc., 34 HARV. ENVT’L L.REV. 425, 430 (2010) (noting difficulty in quantifying
environmental benefits).
161
E.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 139, 369-70 (1997)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS] (advocating modified form of cost-benefit
analysis that would allow departures from purely economic criteria).
162
See, e.g., Christina Ditty, The Frustration of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act: Clean Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 141,
148 (2006) (noting cost-benefit requirement in Washington environmental law);
Samuel Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J. L. & COM. 549, 557-59
(1996) (noting attempts by Illinois and air quality agency for southern California to
perform cost-benefit analysis).
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limit on government authority to alienate public trust property or
impair public trust values.163
Second, the fact that the proposed canon influences outcomes by
filtering pro−public trust preferences through other legal requirements
means that treating the doctrine as a canon will not yield the same
results as a free-standing public trust doctrine. As explained earlier,164
if the underlying legal requirement is that the decision-maker consider
particular factors in making its decision, then this canon would likely
require the agency to consider public trust values. By contrast, if the
underlying law is substantive — for example, if it permitted alienation
of public trust property or destruction of public trust values — then
that authority would be construed more narrowly. Thus, sensitively
applied, the canon would impact actual decisions in ways potentially
far different from those that might obtain under a legally binding
public trust rule.
V.

UNDERSTANDING THE CANON AND ITS UNDERLYING DOCTRINE

The final, and in some ways most fundamental, objection to this
Article’s proposed canon is that it does not respond to the concerns
that motivated it. This argument levels essentially the same objection
to the proposed canon that some scholars and judges level at the
Supreme Court’s embrace of intermediate scrutiny in the equal
protection context: that it represents nothing but a poorly thought-out
compromise between two extreme positions, rather than the result of a
principled legal analysis. As such, the criticism goes, the idea of a
canon simply reflects an unprincipled compromise between the
extreme positions of no dry-land public trust-based protection at all
and, on the other side, a binding legal rule protecting dry-land public
163
See, e.g., Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 444
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (“[A]ny attempt by the state to relinquish its power over a public
resource should be invalidated under the [public trust] doctrine.”); Zack’s, Inc. v. City
of Sausalito, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797 (Ct. App. 2008) (limiting, under the public trust
doctrine, the state’s power to alienate tidelands and submerged lands); State by
Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977) (employing “public trust
principles” to limit the state’s ability to sell land held for the public); see also People v.
Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82 (Cal. 1913) (quoting Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 372
(1867)) (“The right of the state is subservient to the public rights of navigation and
fishery, and theoretically, at least, the state can make no disposition of them
prejudicial to the right of the public to use them for the purposes of navigation and
fishery, and, whatever disposition she does make of them, her grantee takes them
upon the same terms upon which she holds them, and of course, subject to the public
rights above mentioned.”).
164
See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
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trust resources to the same degree as their aquatic counterparts. This
objection requires that we think more carefully about the public trust
doctrine, so we can determine whether the proposed canon constitutes
an analytically plausible tool for courts. This argument requires a
return to our earlier consideration of the proper grounding for the
public trust doctrine in American law.165
The first step in responding to this objection recognizes that a
public trust canon is not an innovation in American law. Instead, it
grows out of the undoubted existence of the core public trust doctrine
as expressed in cases such as Illinois Central. In this sense, the canon
could be understood as a penumbra emanating from the core
component of the doctrine. Of course, penumbras can be criticized as
unprincipled. Justice Black’s criticism of the most famous penumbra in
American law — the “right of privacy” Justice Douglas discerned in
Griswold v. Connecticut166 — centered on this argument.167 The
challenge is to discern a principled reason to view the core, waterbased public doctrine as a foundation for this broader penumbra.
One can meet this challenge by understanding the development of
the core doctrine not as an arbitrary rule that singles out water-based
resources for special protection, but as an exemplification of a broader
American commitment to non-arbitrary government. On this
understanding, legal rules must always be based on some notion of the
public good.168 This understanding allows for vindication of private
interests, but these interests must be the equal and fair beneficiaries of
a general rule enacted to benefit all. This type of requirement has
permeated statements of fundamental American law, from “law of the
land” clauses in early state constitutions to prohibitions on “class
legislation” during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, to
the Equal Protection Clause.169
Of course, stated at this high level of generality, this rule is difficult
for courts to apply.170 When confronted with fundamental but vague
165

See supra Part III.A.
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
167
See id. at 507, 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
168
See generally Sunstein, Nondelegation, supra note 58 (identifying concern for the
public good as a fundamental requirement of legislative action under the U.S.
Constitution).
169
See generally V.F. Nourse, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection,
58 DUKE L.J. 955 (2009) (noting this history).
170
See, e.g., Richard Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873–
1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 705 (1980) (noting how the Supreme Court’s investigation
into the reasonableness of legislative classifications in the late nineteenth century
inevitably led it to an ultimately-abandoned practice of evaluating the wisdom of the
166
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rules, courts often craft more specific legal rules to guide on-theground adjudication of concrete cases. For example, in an attempt to
apply equal protection’s vague command of “treating likes alike,”
courts have crafted an elaborate structure of mediating rules that
require particular scrutiny levels for specific classifications.
Analogously, courts unsure of their competence to police the
substance of the federal-state balance sometimes rely on the political
process, not by completely deferring to congressional legislation, but
rather by requiring Congress to speak plainly when it legislates in
ways that impact that balance.171
The canon proposed here should be understood as a similar
instantiation of the basic imperative that government act in pursuance
of the public interest. It responds to the reality that public trust uses of
natural resources are often under-represented in the politicaladministrative process exactly because of their diffuse nature. At the
same time, as Carol Rose explained, the public may gain significant
benefits from public ownership — benefits that outweigh the
aggregate benefits of private parties’ ownership of the resource. Thus,
government decision-making relating to public trust resources runs
the risk of underprotecting those public values. As such, public trust
values deserve protection from courts.
However, as critics note, it is also true that the doctrine’s expansion
into dry-land resources raises analytical and practical problems.
Precedent, which until recently focused on aquatic resources, does not
directly support this expansion. It also presents the potential for
exceptionally broad applications of the doctrine’s legal rule restricting
government alienation.172 In addition to raising legitimacy concerns,
such an expansion may also test the competence of courts as they are
asked to decide complex land use and ecosystem-management
questions, and evaluate the real costs and benefits associated with
challenged legislation).
171
See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 114, 116 (1992)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that presumption that Congress does not intend to
preempt state law “provides assurance that the federal-state balance will not be
disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (same);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (noting that Congress must speak
plainly when enacting legislation that impacts the federal-state balance), overruled on
other grounds by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
172
For example, one commentator has proposed applying the doctrine to a claim
on behalf of the public that a professional sports team repay government expenditures
on a sports stadium. See Chris Dumbroski, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to
the Pittsburgh Stadium and Exhibition Authority, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63, 65 (2010).
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conflicting resource uses. But it is exactly these problems flowing from
a broader doctrine that lead to under-enforcement of the basic
principle.
An interpretive canon is a mediating rule that provides courts with a
judicially manageable method of vindicating the fundamental
principle of public purpose in government management of natural
resources. When aquatic resources played the most important role in
vindicating public trust values, courts embraced the doctrine to
protect those values. As social needs have changed, many scholars
have called for the law to change as well, and to recognize and protect
those values in a broader set of resources. But objectors have a fair
point that, taken to its logical extreme, such an expansion would be
hard to cabin. In such a situation, where the logic of a legal rule takes
courts beyond their likely competence (or legitimacy), an interpretive
canon becomes more than an unprincipled midway point between a
legally binding rule and no rule at all. Instead, it becomes an
appropriate method of vindicating the underlying principle in a way
that is both accessible to courts and consistent with their legitimacy as
an important player, but not the sole player, in our government
system.173
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to resolve what it describes as the “paradox” of
the public trust doctrine: a deeply felt principle established in
venerable law, but at the same time, an incompletely worked-out legal
doctrine that, in its more aggressive forms, threatens to provide courts
with wide-ranging authority poorly cabined by legal rules. It proposes
a canon approach to an expanded application of the doctrine.
Regardless of whether this proposal gains acceptance, it remains
clear that the public trust doctrine requires further study. Scholars
173
In addition, under this approach it makes sense that the proposed canon would
have little impact in situations where a court already applies a legal requirement
protecting public assets — such as when a state constitutional provision or little
NEPA applies. In such situations it could be said that the resource-protecting law has
directly addressed the resource underrepresentation problem and, thus, obviated the
need for a mediating rule such as an interpretive canon. This makes much more sense
than attempting to find room for an expanded public trust doctrine fitting alongside a
state constitutional provision or little NEPA that applies to the particular case before
the court. Attempting to shoehorn in a public trust doctrine in such a situation raises
serious legitimacy questions, not simply because of the lack of a solid foundation for a
dry-land public trust doctrine, but also because the existence of the constitutional or
statutory protection for the asset would seem to suggest that the legislature had in fact
supplanted any common law dry-land doctrine.
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continue to call for an expansion of the doctrine to respond to the
heightened need for more careful attention before natural resources
are alienated or shifted into private uses. In a world of disappearing
ecosystems and changing climates, our increased understanding of the
benefits those resources provide as publicly owned resources
dedicated to public uses make those calls ever more pressing.
Accommodating those needs within our legal system and traditions is
an urgent task, to which scholars of public law, environmental law,
and property law must turn if the law is to retain its promise of
flexibility and adaptability to new social needs.

